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European Social Democracy (1870-2019)

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“This is the final fall”

**AN ELECTORAL HISTORY OF EUROPEAN
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1870-2019)**



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Abstract

In spite of the fact that a considerable number of words have been written on European Social Democracy, some angles have yet to be considered. One can witness conflicting interpretations on the current state of European Social Democracy. For some, the resilience of European socialism is a reality. For others, it is in obvious decline, and, if one follows the lifespan pointed out by Pedersen to its logical conclusion, the end is nigh. The purpose of this paper is to weigh up these differing views regarding the fate of European Social Democracy and to understand the electoral dynamics underpinning the movement over a period of 150 years.

Based on an analysis of 692 elections held in 32 European States between 1870 and 2019, four major stages in the electoral history of Social Democracy are isolated : a) a gradual emergence at the end of the 19th century and a first flight at the start of the 20th, b) the establishment of the parties in the European political landscape at the close of WWI and an electoral peak more or less reached from the 1930's in established democracies, c) a stabilisation of this performance over half a century and d) a downturn which started in the 1980's, leading to a very marked decline in the 2010's. The European family of socialists suffered a catastrophic decline between 2010 and 2019.

The electoral history of European Social Democracy is put into perspective with that of the whole socio-economic left, which makes it possible to point out not only the marked fall in the contemporary period but also the loss of influence of Social Democracy within the left spectrum.

Résumé

Malgré un nombre appréciable de contributions consacrées à la social-démocratie européenne, il subsiste certains angles morts dans l'analyse de cette famille politique. Un conflit d'interprétation sur l'état actuel de la social-démocratie européenne se donne par ailleurs à voir. Pour certains, la résilience du socialisme européen est réelle. Pour d'autres, son déclin est patent et, dans la logique de l'empan de vie isolé par Pedersen, sa fin est annoncée. L'objectif de ce papier est d'arbitrer ce différend sur le destin de la social-démocratie européenne et de comprendre sa dynamique électorale sur 150 ans.

À partir d'une analyse de 692 élections intervenues dans 32 États européens entre 1870 et 2019, quatre grandes étapes de l'histoire électorale de la social-démocratie sont mises en évidence : a) une lente émergence à la fin du XIX^e siècle et un premier envol au début du vingtième, b) l'installation dans le paysage politique européen au sortir de la première guerre et un pic électorale qui est quasiment atteint dès les années 1930 dans les pays démocratiquement consolidés, c) une stabilisation de cette performance sur un demi-siècle et d) un tassement entamé dans les années 1980 qui mène à un déclin très prononcé dans les années 2010. Le chute de la famille socialiste européenne entre 2010 et 2019 est détonante.

L'histoire électorale de la social-démocratie européenne est mise en perspective de celle de l'ensemble de la gauche socio-économique, ce qui permet d'observer non seulement la chute marquante dans la période contemporaine mais aussi la perte d'influence de la social-démocratie au sein du spectre de gauche.



INTRODUCTION

Ever since its birth in the last quarter of the 19th century, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to studying the family of European social democrats. Make no mistake, it is one of the European political families which has been subjected to the greatest amount of scrutiny (along with communism), even if, to date, political scientists have overwhelmingly focused on the populist radical right.

Research into European socialism concentrates for the most part on the twists and turns (towards (neo) liberalism for this political family, the complex relation which this bears to the GAL/TAN cleavage (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Abou-Chadi & Wagner, 2020), the way it has transformed its organisational models (Delwit, 2019) or its approach to its programmes and ideology (Bremmer, 2018). In spite of the fact that a considerable number of words have been written on the topic, some angles have yet to be considered. Incidentally, one can witness conflicting interpretations on the current state of European Social Democracy. For some, the resilience of European socialism is a reality. For others, it is in obvious decline, and, if one follows the life span pointed out by Pedersen (1981) to its logical conclusion, the end is nigh (Ahluwalia & Miller, 2017).

The purpose of this paper is to weigh up these differing views regarding the fate of European Social Democracy and to understand the electoral dynamics underpinning the movement over a period of 150 years. Is European Social Democracy demonstrating a marked capacity to resist, a “longevity which one can’t help but admire” (Escalona, 2018: 2), is it undergoing the “slight decline” mentioned at the start of the 2008 economic and financial crisis (Moschonas, 2011) or does the state in which it currently finds itself herald the end of its life cycle? One can examine this issue from several angles, using any number of indicators. Insofar as we are interested in the fate of the parties, we have looked at the voting variable. Without excluding other factors, it provides the clearest indication of the situation in which the party or family of parties finds itself and refers to two key elements in the salience of a party as picked out by



Sartori (1976). A crucial indicator in any parliamentary democracy, it is all the more fundamental when one considers that the funding of political parties is intimately linked to how they perform in the polls (Katz & Mair, 1995). Moreover, voting data have the advantage of allowing a sufficiently robust comparison to be made between parties and timeframes. Nevertheless, there are also conflicting interpretations when it comes to how to analyse electoral data. Benedetto, Hix and Mastrococco (2020) recently set out a vision of the electoral path for European Social Democracy. It throws up some problems which do not allow us fully to chart the electoral history of this political family. This paper suggests taking a more wide-ranging view, particularly in terms of time, and adopting different methods when it comes to describing how things have developed and changed.

But what is the fairest way to judge the path taken by European Social Democracy? Seen from a chronological standpoint, rather than working on a century (Benedetto, Hix & Mastrococco, 2020), we have considered all of the elections taking place between 1870 and 2019 in a setting which can be considered to fall into the category of a free and fair political election for all European countries, even if the States in which they took place were not yet entirely democratic when the voting happened.

Electoral contests analysed over a long time period need to be viewed with caution. The process of *becoming* democracies happens on distinct dates for each of the States. Some of them can be seen as having been democratic since the end of the 19th century. For others, the transition towards democracy occurred far later; sometimes, it was a very recent development. It is therefore imperative to include in the protocol and analysis the various waves of democratisation and, sometimes, *de-democratisation*. To be sure, the path towards democracy is not linear for all countries. Some countries have witnessed their democracies contract, as we can note with Germany, Austria or Italy in the inter-war period (Huntington, 1991). Here, the contemporary period raises new questions, with regard to the dip in democratic quality experienced by numerous States and the process of autocratization at work (Cassani & Tomini, 2019). From 1870 until 2019, numerous States saw their borders change in some ways. Some disappeared Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and other



borders came into existence. Any comparisons must therefore be made with a certain degree of hindsight.

In our article, thirty-two States have been included in the comparison (Tables 41 & 42, in appendix). In light of the way democracy has unfolded chronologically in Europe, three groups have been established. The first is comprised of all the States which have been democratic since at least the end of the Second World War *Europe of 15*. This does not signify that they have been democratic throughout the period being studied (1870-2019). This first group brings together Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The second *Europe of 20* adds Cyprus, Malta and three States impacted by the first wave of democratisation which took place in the 1970's in Southern Europe: Greece, Portugal and Spain. The final group *Europe of 32* adds twelve States affected by the last wave of democratisation, brought about by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of Yugoslavia: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Slovakia. We have not taken into consideration Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, where the *quality* of the elections, democracy or electoral data is either inadequate or too recent.

In order to present the timeline of the electoral performances of the social democrat family, we have taken all elections considered sufficiently democratic which took place between 1870 et 2019 in the aforementioned States for whom credible electoral results were available. I have used official Information State by State and data collected by Mackie & Rose (1991) and Nohlen & Stöver (2010). In total, our analysis encompasses 692 elections (Table 42, in appendix). In order to appreciate and interpret the electoral dynamics at play for European social democrats in the most subtle manner possible, we have taken into account the results of three categories of players.

The first brings together the performance of the social democratic party (sometimes two social democratic parties) in each country. In the vast majority of cases, the choice of party is simple. However, in some circumstances, questions may arise. Unless otherwise stated, the parties taken into account are groups labelled 'social democrat'



by dint of their belonging to at least one of the two large international organisations within Social Democracy: The Socialist International (SI, previously the Labour and Socialist International LSI) and the Party of European Socialists (PES, previously the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community CSPEC) (Table 42, in appendix). This is the approach we have taken to Social Democracy. We do not adopt the approach taken by Benedetto, Hix and Mastrorocco (2020: 4), who included other political actors, like the Italian Communist Party. We see no reason to proceed in such a fashion. Moreover, including a party on whom a ban had been placed notably by the American presidency from being involved in government seems strange (Heurtebize, 2014).

The second category of political groupings concerns dissidence within these social democratic parties, be this fleeting or longer-lasting. In so doing, we wish to avoid having a misleading effect on the way the electoral curve is viewed owing to what may be the temporary impact of dissidence. The third group includes the result of the radical left parties, whose identity binds them to the class cleavage. These parties have been, and remain, the chief competitors within the social democratic parties when it comes to this cleavage and it is thus important to take a more wide-ranging view of the electoral performances of European social democrats than the mere result of this family. Until 1989, most of the radical left was made up of communist parties. For thirty years, the spectre of the radical left in Europe has undergone considerable changes (Delwit, 2016; Amini, 2015). Aggregating the three party groups will allow us to interpret the voting curve in European social democracies in connection with that of the socio-economic left as a whole.

A number of difficulties arose when it came to categorising the various parties. Two complex trade-offs were involved. In Denmark, there was a problem with the Socialist People's Party (SF). Having originally come into being as a result of dissent within the communist party, the SF was one of the first parties to present itself as a party of the Libertarian Left (Kitschelt, 1988). For several years, it was also a member of the Nordic Green Left Alliance, observer to the European Green Party and a member of the Greens in the European Parliament. The Socialist People's Party ended up joining the



European Green Party. Cognisant of these factors, we did not include this party in the group of European left-wing radicals.

The Irish party Sinn Fein is included in the Confederal Group of the European United Left Nordic Green Left in the European Parliament. However, its identity can be traced first and foremost to the split between the centre and periphery and the party's desire for Irish reunification. Historically, this problem is linked in part to the development of left-wing organisations in Ireland. However, it seemed awkward to us to include Sinn Fein in the group of radical European left-wing parties when looking at socio-economic divides. SF was not included in the analysis either.

In order to understand and analyse the voting curve in European social democracies over a one-hundred-and-fifty-year period, we opted for a method which allowed us to evaluate the dynamics at play in the best possible way. We calculated the average result by decade for each party. The score is the ratio of the total number of votes cast for the party to the valid votes cast in every election held that decade. We then calculated the ten-year average for Social Democracy by the average for all parties and proceeded in this way for the sub-categories which we will address at a later stage. The ten-year averages are calculated based on ballots held between 00 and 09. This methodological choice allows us 1) to avoid granting too much space to periodically explosive elections, both in terms of upward and downward trends and 2) to immunise the number of elections taken into consideration within a decade for a State and avoid related falls in this area, in particular outsizing parties which regularly stand for election. Finally, 3) this helps us avoid giving a disproportionate weight to more heavily- populated States in our analysis.

1. THE LIFESPAN OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

At first glance, what do the developments in the average voting curve for social democratic parties over 150 years show us? If we take into account the fifteen States which have become democracies since the Second World War, four timeframes can be picked out.



1.1 A gradual rise to power

Before the First World War, European Social Democracy could be viewed as an archipelago. Karl Marx could indeed talk of a spectre haunting Europe in the mid-19th century (Marx, 1848), but until the end of the century, European social democratic parties remained very geographically confined, and therefore electorally confined, in a Europe whose progress along the path towards democracy was slow.

Social democratic parties only participated in national elections within a democratic framework in eight States and the average result was modest. In the 1870s, the German social democrats (Table 19, in appendix) achieved an average result of a little under 7%. In the following decade, our analysis broadens to incorporate three States, achieving a collected score of 4.5%. And in the closing decade of the century, we can witness an expansion both in terms of the number of cases and the result: a little below 10% on average in eight countries (Table 1). As Bartolini observed (2000: 79), in this sequence, developments and growth rates are low. To be sure, this is a combined result. And within this group, two very dominant parties provoke admiration and fear in equal measure, not to mention regular scrutiny: the German and Austro-Hungarian social democratic parties (Table 9). Before the 20th century had even begun, these two parties dominated the political landscape in terms of organisation, culture and politics. To be sure, they were active in two crucial States. Yet, for all that, these two large social democratic parties represent isolated cases. Nevertheless, their prospects were already apparent. And this “extraordinary rise of socialist labour parties since the 1880s” could already feed “marvellous hope, of the historic inevitability of their triumph” (Hobsbawm, 1989: 118).

The dawn of the 20th century saw a dual shift within the social democratic family: an extension in the number of States affected by democratisation and, at the same time, the emergence of parties worthy of the name. This translated, inter alia, into a marked increase in election results. From the first decade of the century, the social democrats achieved a combined score of 15.2% in eleven States (Table 1). In light of these observations, it thus seems mistaken to me to trace the ‘emergence’ of European Social Democracy back to just after 1918 (Benedetto, Hix & Mastrococco, 2020: 20).



In the second decade, naturally very affected by the First World War, social democrats settled at 20.5% in fourteen countries and even 21.3% if we include Estonia (Table 16, in appendix).

1.2 A ceiling reached since the interwar period

In the interwar period, one can observe how Social Democracy significantly increased its electoral low water. From the 1920's onward, it stood at 26.6% in the Europe of 15 and 23.4% on average in twenty States (Table 1). The progression thus involves performance and coverage at the same time. As Moschonas underscores, this decade for Social Democracy was thus a lot more than "a decade of organizational and electoral stabilization" (Moschonas, 2018: 524). In the 1930's, Social Democracy achieved, so to speak, the low-water mark which was to be its ceiling in the Europe of 15: 30%.

This was not exactly the pinnacle, which was achieved in the Europe of 15 in the 1950's and 1960's. However, the margin is very small. In contrast, if we take into consideration an analysis of all the States in question, the differential is more pronounced. However, it must be assessed in light of the social democrats' failure to lay down strong roots in Eastern European States, a factor which no longer featured in calculations until democratisation at the end of the century. Seen through this lens, one can therefore take two views: our proposal which highlights a type of ceiling reached in the 1930's in a context characterised by certain democratic contractions or one which believes that the electoral golden age occurred in the 1960's (Benedetto, Hix & Mastrococco, 2020; Escalona, 2018). Formally speaking, in the Europe of 15, it was indeed in the 1950's and 1960's that the electoral summit was reached. That being said, it is also important to observe that a voting ceiling calculated as a ten-year average was already reached in several States: Denmark (Table 15, in appendix), Finland (Table 17, in appendix) and Switzerland (Table 39, in appendix). In Belgium, it had even already been reached in the 1920's (Table 10, in appendix)! In the 1960's, the summit was reached in three places: Ireland (Table 23, in appendix), Luxembourg (Table 27, in appendix) and Sweden (Table 38, in appendix). As for the 1950's, a ceiling was reached in Norway (Table 30, in appendix).



1.3 Stabilisation for forty years

In the aftermath of the Second World War, average performance stabilised at around 30% of votes and rose to a little under 31% in the 50's and 60's, a pinnacle in the Europe of 15.

From the 1940's to 1970's, the overall score is rather stable: 29.7 to 30.9% of the votes in the Europe of 15 and 29.8% to 31.6% in all States concerned with parliamentary democracy (sixteen in the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's and twenty in the 1970's).

1.4 From erosion to definite decline

The start of the 1980's marked an unmistakable dip in the *Europe of 15*. The average score achieved by European social democrats in this category went below the 29% bar. This overall slump in the group continued in the 1990's (28.4%) and in the first decade of the 21st century (26.9%). The second decade of the 21st century bore witness to a spectacular drop: 5.5 average percentage points (- 20.1% of votes). With 21.4% of the votes, the overall result for social democrats in the *Europe of the 15* found itself at exactly the same level as it had done a century earlier (Table 1).

The slumps noted in the 1980's, 1990's and 2000's in the *Europe of 15* are, seen more broadly, offset by the development of southern socialism. With the exception of Cyprus (Table 13, in appendix), socialist parties in southern Europe made notable progress in the phase of democratic consolidation and afterwards. Socialist parties in that region have regularly been the main party in the political system (Delwit, 2007). This performance of Latin socialism in the polls allowed the family of social democrats, which had spread to include these countries, to remain at around 30%: 29.8% in the 1980's, 30.3% in the 1990's and 30.2% in the 2000's. In contrast, the aggregation with the overall results of the social democratic parties in central and Eastern Europe leads us to far lower average scores: 25.9% in the 1990's and 27.2% the following decade.

Looking back at these observations, the decline of European Social Democracy can be examined in a more clear-cut way in the 2010's if we include the socialist parties from southern Europe: 22.5% (- 6.5 percentage points and 22.3% of the votes compared with the previous decade) and it appears very substantial taking into



account all States: 4.6 percentage points compared with the previous decade (- 17.1% of the votes).

Seen over a long period of time, the contemporary politico-electoral decline of European Social Democracy is thus, without a doubt, corroborated. In the 2010's, this is striking. The average score achieved by social democrats stood at just roughly 80% of what it had achieved a decade earlier, 70% of what was sometimes referred to as its glory days or golden age in the 1960's and 1970's (Bergougnieux & Manin, 1989; Merkel, 1989). The overall result for European social democrats scarcely exceeded roughly one fifth of the electorate voting validly.

Table 1. Evolution of Social-Democratic Parties' electoral results in Europe (ten-year average)

	Europe 15	Number of countries taken into account	Europe 20	Number of countries taken into account	Europe 32	Number of countries taken into account
1870-1879	7.0	1	7.0	1	7.0	1
1880-1889	4.5	3	4.5	3	4.5	3
1890-1899	9.6	8	9.6	8	9.6	8
1900-1909	15.2	11	15.2	11	15.2	11
1910-1919	20.5	14	20.5	14	21.3	15
1920-1929	26.6	15	26.1	16	23.4	20
1930-1939	29.9	14	28.9	16	25.2	20
1940-1949	29.7	15	31.6	16	31.6	16
1950-1959	30.9	15	31.6	16	31.6	16
1960-1969	30.9	15	31.4	16	31.4	16
1970-1979	29.4	15	29.8	20	29.8	20
1980-1989	28.9	15	30.3	20	30.3	20
1990-1999	28.4	15	30.2	20	25.9	31
2000-2009	26.9	15	29.1	20	27.2	32
2010-2019	21.4	15	22.6	20	22.3	32



Analysing the results of socialist dissent during the same period does not change the general outline highlighted here. On the whole, European Social Democracy has scarcely been affected by large-scale dissent, other than by the birth of the communist movement after the First World War, of course.

The number of States affected is very small (Table 2). At best, the average percentage on just two occurrences stood at 6.9%. In contemporary times, the level of performance stood at between 1.2 and 1.8% in a limited number of States: four in the *Europe of 15*, six in the *Europe of 20* and ten in the *Europe of 32*. This level is therefore lower than that attained in the 1940's, 1950's or 1960's.

Table 2. Evolution of other Social Democratic Parties' electoral results in Europe (ten-year average)

	Europe 15	Number of countries taken into account	Europe 20	Number of countries taken into account	Europe 32	Number of countries taken into account
1910-1919	0.6	4	0.6	4	0.6	4
1920-1929	0.3	4	0.3	4	3.1	5
1930-1939			0.3	1	2.0	2
1940-1949	1.7	2	1.7	2	1.7	2
1950-1959	0.7	1	6.9	2	6.9	2
1960-1969	2.0	2	2.0	2	2.0	2
1970-1979	4.1	4	3.3	6	3.3	6
1980-1989	1.3	6	1.0	8	1.0	8
1990-1999	0.5	5	0.7	6	0.7	9
2000-2009	1.2	3	1.2	4	1.1	7
2010-2019	1.8	4	1.3	6	1.2	10



And what about the main competitors of Social Democracy on the class cleavage? From the end of the First World War until the fall of the communist systems, the radical left was chiefly embodied by the communist family. After emerging slowly in the polls between the two World Wars, the communist family chalked up its best overall performance in the wake of the Second World War. In thirteen States of the *Europe of 15*, European communism achieved an average score of 11.4% in the 1940's, 8.6% in the 1950's and 9% in the 1960's (Table 3).

In the 1970's, the voting average was greater in the *Europe of 20* given the fact that several States in Southern Europe had made the transition to democracy. In several cases, the communist parties were consistently important in electoral, political and trade union terms Greece (Table 20, in appendix), Portugal (Table 32, in appendix) and Spain (Table 37, in appendix). In Cyprus, the party is extremely strong (Table 13, in appendix).

The 1980's revealed an overall decline. The communist parties lost between 15 and 22% of their electorate over the course of a decade. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the disappearance of the Soviet Union in summer 1991 appeared to sound the death knell for the communist family and more broadly the spectre of the left to the left of Social Democracy. In the 1990's and 2000's, communists only managed 5% in the *Europe of 15* (average score in fourteen States) and 7.9% in the *Europe of 20* (average score in eighteen States).

However, and contrary to what we discovered about Social Democracy; the contemporary period records a ripple for the parties of the radical European left. Average performances were better than previous ones, irrespective of the groups of States in question. In the *Europe of 20*, the average result even stood at 10.8% (average score in eighteen States). In the 2010's, the radical left parties embarked upon very different ideological paths. It was not just that they appeared unaffected by the marked decline of the social democratic parties. They also benefited in part, as we can see in Greece, in the Netherlands (Table 29, in appendix) or in France (Table 18, in appendix).

Table 3. Evolution of Radical Left Parties' electoral results in Europe (ten-year average)

	Europe 15	Number of countries taken into account	Europe 20	Number of countries taken into account	Europe 32	Number of countries taken into account
1910-1919	1.0	3	1.0	3	1.0	3
1920-1929	3.2	13	3.2	14	3.5	15
1930-1939	4.4	13	4.5	15	4.9	16
1940-1949	11.4	14	11.4	14	11.4	14
1950-1959	8.6	14	8.8	15	8.8	15
1960-1969	9.0	14	10.6	16	10.6	16
1970-1979	8.7	15	11.3	19	11.3	19
1980-1989	6.7	15	8.9	19	8.5	19
1990-1999	5.6	14	7.9	18	6.7	26
2000-2009	5.7	15	7.9	19	6.7	26
2010-2019	6.4	14	10.8	18	8.2	26

By aggregating the three categories of political players European Social Democracy, social-democrat dissidence and those on the radical left the electoral pathway of the socio-economic left is very close to the one which is pinpointed as being the only European Social Democracy. The four timeframes highlighted here can be clearly located. Nevertheless, there are some discrepancies.

On average over ten years, performances reached their peak in the 1940's. In this way, the exit from the Second World War marked the true apogee of the European left parties. Later on, the situation stabilised. In the 1980's and 1990's, things slumped in a way which becomes clearer when one looks beyond the prism of European Social Democracy. Moreover, the average percentage observed in the last decade was the weakest since the 1920's in the *Europe of 15* (See Table 4).

Table 4. Evolution of Left Parties' electoral results in Europe (ten-year average)

	Europe 15	Number of countries taken into account	Europe 20	Number of countries taken into account	Europe 32	Number of countries taken into account
1870-1879	7.0	1	7.0	1	7.0	1
1880-1889	4.5	3	4.5	3	4.5	3
1890-1899	9.6	8	9.6	8	9.6	8
1900-1909	15.2	11	15.2	11	15.2	11
1910-1919	21.1	14	21.1	14	21.9	15
1920-1929	29.8	15	27.5	17	25.5	21
1930-1939	34.0	14	30.9	17	27.7	21
1940-1949	40.5	15	41.7	16	41.7	16
1950-1959	39.0	15	38.4	17	38.4	17
1960-1969	39.4	15	37.4	18	37.4	18
1970-1979	38.9	15	41.4	20	41.4	20
1980-1989	36.0	15	39.1	20	37.3	20
1990-1999	33.8	15	37.5	20	31.5	31
2000-2009	32.7	15	36.8	20	32.8	32
2010-2019	27.8	15	32.7	20	29.3	32

2. DIFFERENT DESTINIES WITHIN EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY?

Do European social democratic parties all develop under the same banner? Does the marked electoral decline of the last decade affect all of them to the same extent? In order to answer these questions, we have divided European Social Democracy into six categories.



The first brings together German-speaking social democratic parties. The group includes two historical social democratic parties, the German social democratic party (SPD) and its Austrian counterpart (SPÖ), as well as the social democratic party of Switzerland (SPS). The latter does not enjoy the same renown as its German and Austrian alter egos. It has never had their reach, influence and strength. However, its history has been considerably impacted by these two large parties.

The second includes Benelux parties, operating within the framework of consociational democracies (Lijphart, 1991). Social democrats from Belgium (PS and sp.a), the Netherlands (PVDA) and Luxembourg (LSAP) are not, from an historical point of view, the largest party in the political system. Vectors of the 'workers' side of the socio-economic cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), they operate within political systems which have, for a long time, been heavily influenced by the philosophical divide, which saw Catholic parties establish themselves as the main political force (Delwit, 2012). Incidentally, this still applies in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. As with the category of German-speaking countries, these States are also those where green parties notched up their best electoral performances in the last thirty years (Close & Delwit, 2016).

The third aggregates the Nordic social democratic parties. A very large number of works dedicated to Social Democracy refer to several parties in this category, in particular the Danish social democrats (SD), to an even greater extent the Swedish social democrats (SAP) and, to a lesser extent, the Norwegian social democrats (DNA). They are the representatives of the social democratic archetype. Although they are influenced both intellectually and politically speaking by this tradition, the Finnish social democrats (SDP), rivals for a long time to the communists after 1945 (SKDL), and the Icelandic social democrats (XS, Table 22, in appendix) never enjoyed the same electoral, political and trade union clout.

In the fourth group, we can find the Anglo-Saxon workers' parties; namely the British Labour Party (LP), the Social Democratic and Labour Party of Northern Ireland (SDLP) and the Irish Labour Party (LP).



The fifth group has been dealt with a considerable amount in the past. It refers to the socialist parties of Southern Europe. The socialist parties of Southern Europe are guided by an organisational model which is distinct from the classic social democrat model. They operate in States where the socio-economic divide is historically preeminent. In four out of five configurations, the socialist parties had to face, and are still facing, a communist party or powerful competition from the radical left, to the extent that in France, Italy or Cyprus, the communist party has regularly supplanted the socialist party. This remains the case in Cyprus and has become the case in Greece (Katsourides, 2016). In contrast, in Italy, where the communist party shone from the 1950's until the 1980's, the radical left is now more or less non-existent. In Malta, a different pattern emerges. The political system, which is very close to that of the historical British system, is the perfect example of a two-party system. Workers (MLP) (Table 28, in appendix) stand against nationalists (NP).

Finally, the configuration is rather heterogeneous in Central, Baltic and Eastern European countries. Social democratic parties sometimes take the form of old communist parties converting into something else, as we can see in Poland (SLD) or Bulgaria (BSP). At other times, they are parties which are born on the fringes of former communist groups, as seen in the Czech Republic (CSSD). Incidentally, the way the political landscape is set out is at odds with the divides which are, in part separate from the political landscape of 'Western' Europe.

2.1 Electoral dynamics in the six categories

A comparative analysis of the six groups reveals dissimilarities: one can observe that the peak in electoral influence for social democrats was effectively already achieved in the Nordic group of social democrats in the 1930's (Table 5). The period of stabilisation after the war was already happening in the light of a dip in the polls. One can also note, as a counter-current to the pinnacle reached by the Swedish social democrats, that signs of erosion were already appearing in the 1960's: the electoral average for social democratic parties in this group fell by 3.1 percentage points compared with the previous decade. When one considers this in hindsight, one is



struck by this fact. In the 2010's, the average score of the Nordic social democratic parties 22.5% settled at just 61.3% of their maximum score achieved in the polls (36.7%).

The electoral dynamics underpinning German-speaking Social Democracy can be broken down in a different way. The peak was achieved far later in the day than it was in the other categories. This dimension is partially linked to the interruption of democracy in Germany and Austria in 1933 and 1935 respectively until the emergence from the Second World War. The percentage notched up following the first global conflict was already impressive 32.0% and the rest in the in the 1920's. Following the Second World War, however, these performances were surpassed. In this group of social democratic parties, a maximum was achieved in the 1970's (39.4%), far later, therefore, than for the first group. During this decade, Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky served, alongside Olof Palme (1976), as the key spokespeople for European Social Democracy. The average result for the SPÖ stood at 50% (Table 9, in appendix) and that of the SPD at 44.2% (Table 19, in appendix). In Switzerland, by contrast, the peak had already been achieved in the 1930's. In the 1980's, the movement was reversed in notable fashion (- 4.4 percentage points compared with the previous decade). And, in spite of the SPD coming back into favour at the end of the 1990's, the decline continued. In the 2010's, German-speaking Social Democracy dropped 7 percentage points compared with the first decade of the 21st century and 17.3% compared with the 1970's. In forty years, the average drop was of 45% of the electoral base in the 1970's. This collapse is illustrated by the lowest score achieved by the German and Austrian social democrats in the last election of the 2010's: 20.5% for the SPD (2017) and 21.2% for the SPÖ (2019).

In the Benelux states, the voting curve looks different to what we have seen in the first two categories. Socialists in Belgium, the Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg increased their votes uninterrupted from the end of the 19th century until the 1950's, when the average electoral peak occurred: 33.2%. From this time, one could witness a slump which was briefly interrupted in the 1980's. Having passed the threshold of 30% in the 1970's, the Benelux socialists dipped on average below 25% in the 1990's and, in the last decade, 20%. Of the six categories with which we are concerned, the worst average score was reached in the 2010's. This critical situation is



best embodied by the Dutch Labour Party (PVDA), which got everyone talking with its score of 5.7% in the 2017 legislative elections.

In Great Britain and Ireland, voting dynamics reveal a bumpier curve. Social democrats did increasingly well in the polls until the 1960's: an average result of 30% was achieved in that decade. After this, things dipped a little, until average results slipped below 20% in the 1980's, a decade in which the British Labour Party lost members of its own party who broke away to form the social democratic party (SDP), which joined forces with the liberals (Delwit, 1995). After hitting this electoral low point (Table 40, in appendix), things improved markedly in the 1980's. In the 21st century, overall performance declined once again. Parties based on the Anglo-Saxon model hit an electoral low water mark which was one of the lowest in their electoral history.

For a fully working comparison, analysing *Latin socialism* can only truly operate from the 1970's onwards. Previously, data only concerned France over the entire period and Italy, on an ongoing basis, after 1945, and, in part, Malta. The democratisation of the Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and Cypriot political systems changed the overall dynamics of the European social democratic family. The majority of socialist parties in these States, exactly as with France and Italy, made similar progress in the 1980's and, for some, in the 1990's and 2000's (Moschonas, 2011: 62). The average electoral peak for socialism in Southern Europe occurred in this way in the 2000's: 33%. Examined as part of an overall assessment, this movement of Southern socialism had the effect of making up for the erosion and slumps in other categories experienced by the social democratic family. *A contrario*, in the 2010's, as we saw, a significant decline was underway. It was symbolised by the catastrophic decline of the Greek socialists, the woeful score achieved by the French socialists in 2017, and the sharp reversal of fortunes for the Spanish socialists.

In Central, Eastern and Baltic Europe, it is more difficult to measure how a political family evolves, as it is true that the space and time needed to assess such evolutions is far too short. What is more, the number of instances taken into consideration changes during this period. In general terms, the social democratic left made little impact in the first decade after the fall of the communist systems. In many countries,



the socialist parties were viewed as being part and parcel of the 'left', i.e., the former communist parties (De Waele, 1999). This fantasy was, incidentally, based on the fact that several social democratic parties were, entirely or in part, the heirs apparent to the former communist parties: in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and, *de facto*, in Romania. The average result of the socialist and social democratic parties surged in the 2000's. But this pattern was soon broken. In Central, Eastern and Baltic Europe, the situation of the social democratic family became 'balkanised'. In voting terms, the situation got a lot worse for some parties, as witnessed in Poland (SLD, Table 31, in appendix), in the Czech Republic (CSSD, Table 14, in appendix), in Slovenia (SD, Table 36, in appendix), in Lithuania (LSDP, Table 26, in appendix) or in Hungary (MSZP, Table 21, in appendix). In Bulgaria, the fall of the BSP was not as steep but its decline was no less marked (Table 11). In contrast, some social democratic parties bounced back in the polls in this period, as seen in Slovakia (SMER, Table 35, in appendix), Romania (PSD, Table 33, in appendix), Croatia (SDP, Table 12, in appendix) or Latvia (Harmony, Table 25, in appendix), even if the SMER and the PSD found themselves in a less favourable situation as the curtain came down on the 2010's.

Table 5. Evolution Social Democratic Parties' electoral results in Europe by category (ten-year average)

	Alemannic Social Democracy	Social Democracy in the BENELUX	Social Democracy in Nordic Countries	Anglo-Saxon Social-democracy	Southern Socialism	Social Democracy in the ECEC
1870-1879	7.0					
1880-1889	8.9	0.9	3.8			
1890-1899	15.8	10.1	5.2		7.1	
1900-1909	18.7	17.2	15.5	3.5	13.4	
1910-1919	27.6	18.8	24.4	3.6	21.3	33.3
1920-1929	29.9	24.4	29.7	22.1	20.6	12.4
1930-1939	29.9	27.5	36.7	21.1	21.2	10.7
1940-1949	32.6	28.4	34.6	29.6	30.1	
1950-1959	33.4	33.2	34.8	28.6	25.0	
1960-1969	35.9	30.1	34.2	30.4	23.9	
1970-1979	39.4	26.8	31.1	25.9	27.2	
1980-1989	35.0	28.9	30.4	19.3	32.1	
1990-1999	31.7	24.5	30.8	27.0	32.5	18.1
2000-2009	29.1	23.5	29.3	23.6	33.0	23.9
2010-2019	22.1	18.3	22.5	23.2	24.6	21.8

What can be said about rivalry between organisations on the radical left in the six categories?

In German-speaking countries, this has always been contained, other than in the interwar period in Germany. Until 1933, the KPD progressively made its mark as an extremely powerful party, both at the polls and within society (Evans, 2003). In the three countries, electoral progress remained modest as the Second World War came to an end. And, over time, the influence wielded by communism became weaker, or even marginal. In Switzerland and Austria, this observation remains valid. In Germany, the reunification process led to the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) taking a seat at



the political table, before becoming part of Die Linke. Die Linke polled well in the 2009, 2013 and 2017 elections (Table 20, appendix), but it's a very unbalanced picture we see when it comes to its uptake: the party's performance is consistent in the six Eastern *Laender*, but weak in the *Laender* located in what was the Federal Republic of Germany. The fact remains that after the second Schröder government (2002-2005), the SPD witnessed a new left-wing competitor establish itself and challenge it in trade union circles and at the polls, with a certain degree of success.

In Benelux countries, the radical left established itself in a limited, but not marginal, fashion. In Belgium (Delwit, 2018) and in the Netherlands, the communist parties have been textbook examples of content format. In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the weight of the KPL was more convincing, in particular in the South of the country around the iron and steel basins. Nevertheless, leaving aside the period after the Second World War, overall polling performances were moderate: between 4 and 7% of votes. In the 1980's, the communist parties declined considerably in the three countries. In the Netherlands, the CPN even scuppered its chances by incorporating GreenLeft (Voerman & Lucardie, 2016). In this decade and even more so in the 1990's, the overall result was at its lowest.

Since then, and in contrast with the dynamics at play within the leadership of the social democratic parties in these countries, the radical left rediscovered a new political and electoral vigour. This process operated primarily through the distinct groupings of the historical communist parties: the Labour party in Belgium (PTB-PVDA) (Delwit, 2014; Goovaerts, Kern, van Haute & Marlen, 2020), the Socialist Party (SP) (Voerman, 2012) and The Left in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. In this way, the average result in the 2010's rose to 6.7% as compared with 5.1% in the 2000's and 2.3% in the 1990's.

In Northern Europe, the communist parties only made a very small dent in the strength and reach of the powerful social democratic structures in Sweden, Norway and Denmark before 1945. Following the Second World War, the overall power of the communist groupings nevertheless grew in this group. This can for one thing be linked to the new importance of the Finnish communists and, to a lesser extent, Icelandic communists, but also a level reached by the Swedish communists. The average score achieved by radical left parties thus stood within a range of between 9.6% and 12.7%



(Table 6) for four decades. As was the case for almost all communist parties, the 1980's saw a marked decline, in particular in the leadership of the Finnish communists. However, this period was also involved the redesigning of the Nordic radical left parties which, very often, include many aspects of the libertarian left (Gomez, Morales & Ramiro, 2016) and have a socio-economic profile which is less markedly on the left than in the past (Fagerholm, 2017: 27). Here, the Red-Green Alliance in Denmark or the Left-Green Movement in Iceland spring to mind in particular. But this also concerns the shifts in the former communist parties in Finland and Sweden which have become, respectively, the Left Alliance (VAS) and the party of the Left (V). These transformations have given results which contrast in part but have stuck to the electoral low water mark of the Nordic radical left of around 9% over the last three decades, even as the social democratic parties in these States were undergoing a very pronounced decline.

In Great Britain and Ireland, it's never been a consistent story in the polls for radical left parties. The communist party of Great Britain proved influential in some working-class sectors through the intermediary of trade union branches or in the university sphere, but it never overcame the difficulty of competing in a first-past-the-post system (Salles, 1977). In Ireland, the *national question* not only put the brakes on the radical left but also the social democratic left, which was historically weak in this State. As we observed in the preamble, Sinn Fein may have a seat in the European United Left/Nordic Green Left in the European Parliament, but its identity relationship refers first and foremost to the matter of the full reunification of Ireland.

It is in Southern Europe that the radical left has historically enjoyed the most success. In France and Italy, communist parties have long outperformed their socialist rivals within the left-wing spectrum (Lazar, 1992). When Cyprus became a democracy, the same rules applied, as indeed they do today. And in the first phase of democratisation in Greece, Spain or Portugal, the communist parties in these States notched up decent scores, albeit far below what they were initially expecting. In the 1980's, the average score for radical left groupings rose again to 20% of the electorate (Table 6). The collapse of communist systems affected all communist parties. In Italy, the communist party overwhelmingly mutated into a group which today is vaguely social democratic in nature, the Democratic Party. In France, the communist party has been wiped off



the national political landscape, only demonstrating a certain consistency at municipal level (Delwit, 2014B). The Spanish Communist Party (PCE) has also become a shadow of what it was until the beginning of the 1980's. For their part, the Greek (KKE) and Portuguese (PCP) communist parties remain *community niche* parties with a societal and electoral reach far smaller than the one they enjoyed in the 1970's and 1980's. Only the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) in Cyprus has remained a party with a strong presence on the island, still beating the socialist party (EDEK).

For all that, this landscape now only takes in part of the various parties on the radical European left. Indeed, many movements have arisen over the course of the last decade. Sometimes, such movements have failed to make an impact. In Italy, the spectre of the radical left is now a field of ruins (Table 24, in appendix). In contrast, things have been shaken up considerably in France, Greece, Portugal and Spain, occasionally to spectacular effect, with the deployment of new players (Escalona, 2018b); Unsubmissive France (FI), the Left (BE) (Lisi, 2013), Syriza and Podemos, respectively. It is too early to assess how long this will last. One might note that, against the backdrop of the major contraction of socialist groupings, the radical left in Southern Europe has made significant progress and, from the 2010's, secured, as a ten-year average, 20% of the electorate.

In Central and Eastern Europe and Baltic Europe, the electoral and political influence of parties on the radical left is very weak. In the first phase of the transition to democracy, just two parties demonstrated a relevant result, the Slovak communist party (KSS) and the Bohemian-Moravian communist party (KSCM). The KSS foundered in obscurity and, currently, the KSCM has lost much of its influence. Recently, a new party, dubbed the Left, came into being in Slovenia, growing out of a merger between the Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia (TRS) and Initiative for Democratic Socialism (IDS). In the most recent election, this party managed 5% of the votes. These few elements of the archipelago do not allow the radical left from Central, Eastern and Baltic Europe to make a strong impact on the polls and make up for losses on the side of the social democrats. The two left-wing families have tended to shed their electoral weight over the course of the last decade.

Table 6. Evolution of Radical Left Parties' electoral results in Europe by category (ten-year average)

1870-1879	Radical Left in Alemannic countries	Radical Left in Benelux countries	Radical Left in Nordic countries	Radical Left in Anglo-Saxon countries	Radical Left In Southern Europe countries	Radical left in Eastern and Central Europe
1910-1919		1.9	0.1			
1920-1929	3.8	1.6	3.4	0.3	6.0	8.1
1930-1939	5.5	3.7	4.3	0.2	8.7	10.3
1940-1949	4.5	10.1	12.7	0.4	26.2	
1950-1959	2.7	4.9	10.3	0.2	19.4	
1960-1969	1.8	7.3	9.6	0.2	23.4	
1970-1979	1.3	4.9	11.3	0.6	23.2	
1980-1989	0.8	3.1	8.5	1.8	18.6	0.0
1990-1999	1.8	2.3	8.4	3.6	14.0	3.5
2000-2009	3.3	5.1	9.1	0.8	13.0	3.4
2010-2019	3.7	6.7	8.7	0.7	19.9	2.3

In the end, an analysis of how the socio-economic left has evolved in our various categories confirms, in four out of five analysable cases, the existence of a bell curve over a long period. For all that, the timeframe which leads to a peak before declining differs from category to category. For the German-speaking Left, the peak was reached in the 1970's with an overall result of around 41% (Table 7). Since then, we have witnessed an abrupt decline. The overall score in the 2010's is fifteen percentage points below this result (- 37.5% of the votes). In Nordic countries, the total of the votes on the left reached its maximum in the 1940's. From the 1950's, a decline began which went on for half a century and deepened strikingly in the 2010's, when the result stood at only 66% of the electoral peak. In the Benelux states and Anglo-Saxon democracies, the peak in the curve occurred in the 1940's and 1950's respectively. Later, there was a trend towards erosion, but this did not happen in a linear fashion. The worst overall performance in Anglo-Saxon countries was thus achieved in the 1980's.



In this table, the prevailing configuration in Southern European countries is singular. The overall result over the last four decades has remained relatively stable. In the 2010's, an erosive movement could nevertheless be detected but it was far more restrained than it was for the other four categories. This singularity illustrates how salient the left-right opposition remains in Southern European countries.

Table 7. Evolution of aggregate Left Parties' electoral results in Europe by category (ten-year average)

	Alemannic Left	Left in Benelux	Nordic countries Left	Anglo-Saxon Left	Southern Europe Left	Left in the ECEC
1870-1879	7.0					
1880-1889	8.9	0.9	3.8			
1890-1899	15.8	10.1	5.2		7.1	
1900-1909	18.7	17.2	15.5	3.5	13.4	
1910-1919	29.4	19.5	24.4	3.6	21.8	33.3
1920-1929	35.2	26.0	31.8	22.5	20.1	16.6
1930-1939	35.4	31.2	40.1	21.3	20.6	14.2
1940-1949	37.1	38.6	47.3	30.6	47.6	
1950-1959	36.1	38.2	45.1	28.7	36.7	
1960-1969	37.8	37.4	43.9	30.5	33.4	
1970-1979	40.8	34.7	42.5	26.5	48.1	
1980-1989	35.9	32.4	39.6	21.1	48.2	
1990-1999	33.6	26.8	39.3	28.8	45.0	20.7
2000-2009	32.3	28.6	38.4	24.4	44.6	26.2
2010-2019	25.8	25.1	31.2	24.3	42.4	23.7

As for the issue with which we are concerned, this singularity also points to an aspect of the contemporary electoral crisis rocking European Social Democracy. Not only did it experience a rapid decline in the 2010's, its clout in the socio-economic left was diminished. The configuration in Southern Europe is the most emblematic, but the



contemporary movement in the Benelux countries and Nordic States is also striking. Although it is also on the way in German-speaking countries, it is less pronounced. It is only the Anglo-Saxon and Central, Eastern and Baltic European configurations which avoid this observation. If we take the last election to date in the 2010's, the social democratic party was outperformed by a radical left grouping on no fewer than six occurrences: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Iceland and the Netherlands (Table 8).

Table 8. Evolution of the weight Social Democratic Parties in the total of Left electoral results by category (ten-year average)

	Weight of Alemannic Social Democracy in the Left	Weight of Benelux Social Democracy in the Left	Weight of the Nordic Social Democracy in the Left	Weight of the Anglo-Saxon Social Democracy in the Left	Weight of Southern Social Democracy in the Left	Weight of CEEC Social Democracy in the Left
1870-1879	100.0					
1880-1889	100.0	100.0	100.0			
1890-1899	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0	
1900-1909	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
1910-1919	93.8	96.8	99.9	98.6	97.5	100.0
1920-1929	84.9	93.8	93.5	98.6	102.6	74.9
1930-1939	84.5	88.1	91.4	99.2	103.2	75.5
1940-1949	87.8	73.7	73.2	96.5	63.3	
1950-1959	92.6	87.1	77.2	99.7	68.0	
1960-1969	95.1	80.4	78.1	99.6	71.5	
1970-1979	96.6	77.1	73.3	97.9	56.5	
1980-1989	97.4	89.1	76.7	91.3	66.5	
1990-1999	94.5	91.3	78.5	93.7	72.2	87.4
2000-2009	89.9	82.3	76.4	96.9	73.9	91.3
2010-2019	85.5	73.2	72.2	95.5	58.1	92.1



CONCLUSION

From a global perspective, we have only been able to pinpoint four large stages in the electoral history of European Social Democracy over the course of one hundred and fifty years: a) a gradual emergence at the end of the 19th century and a first flight at the start of the 20th, b) the establishment of the parties in the European political landscape at the close of WWI and an electoral peak more or less reached from the 1930's in established democracies, c) a stabilisation of this performance over half a century and d) a downturn which started in the 1980's, leading to a very marked decline in the 2010's. The European family of socialists suffered a catastrophic decline between 2010 and 2019.

Until ten years ago, seen from a global perspective, points of view regarding decline and resilience not necessarily mutually exclusive notions could be based on macrodata or some specific cases (Delwit, 2005). At this stage in their lifespan and after the 2010-2019 decade which proved particularly taxing, there can be no doubt as to the major slump suffered by European social democrats. It has never performed so poorly in the polls in a time of broad universal suffrage and, of course, in peacetime.

As we have observed, the electoral drop in the 2010's was considerable. It was part of an overall collapse for the socio-economic left. However, the slump for the social democrats was more pronounced than that experienced by the socio-economic left. To put it a different way, Social Democracy has, in contemporary times, lost its influence over the socio-economic left (Table 9).

What conclusions can we draw from these observations? In light of the cleavage referred to for Social Democracy and for the socio-economic left a mechanistic, fatalistic or deterministic approach (Ferdosi, 2019: 266) is untenable. Be in no doubt, the world of work has changed. Employment has evolved. Socio-professional categories have diversified, and with them the statutes within them. Be that as it may, the fate of Social Democracy is not set in stone (Diamond & Guidi, 2019: 261) but it is linked to its capacity to make its own those socio-economic interests held by working men and women (Berman & Snegovaya, 2019), in a new economic context, as well



as in a framework of political institutions where the Nation State is no longer necessarily pre-eminent.

It seems difficult to us to relate to the equation and dilemma identified by Przeworski and Sprague (1986) in the 1980's: Social Democracy did not fall off a cliff in the 2010's because of a decline experienced by the wage-earning working classes, but rather from the absence of congruence amongst social democrats and the socio-economic expectations of these sections. It is, first and foremost, the strategical choices taken by the parties which are to blame (Merkel, 1992: 20). These conditions have certainly changed. However, we should not overly homogenise the objective, subjectively lived condition of the working classes and, more broadly, working people in retrospect. The movement in the world of work has been constant since the *first* industrial revolution. And the homogeneity of conditions, status and values is a construct in which Social Democracy has played a major political and cultural role, without forgetting that it has never enjoyed the working class vote in its entirety (Callaghan & Tunney, 2001: 65). Anticipating and announcing the death throes of Social Democracy would therefore be presumptuous. Even in its considerably weakened state, European Social Democracy is still pulling in, on average, 22% of European voters.

That said, there are few indications to make us think that a resurgence or major changes are in the offing. Without gaining more of a foothold in socio-economic terms, improving its programming or, above all, when it comes to the exercise of public policy, Social Democracy has nothing original to bring to the table (Wessels, 2010). The socio-economic identity of Social Democracy has undergone a real slump (Loxbo, Hinnefors, Hagevi, Blombäck & Demker, 2019). In some cases, it is even undetectable from the other side of the socio-economic divide, at the cost of leaving in the lurch vast swathes of the salaried working class (Benedetto, Hix & Mastrococco: 13 et ss.. Dostal, 2017).

Social democracy now attracts an electorate which is more frequently associated with the salaried middle classes (Piketty, 2018), without the kind of obvious, clear identity which would set it apart from centrist, regionalist or green parties. So, what is it that makes up the social democratic identity? In other words, who votes or would vote social democrat and why? These crucial questions nevertheless remain broadly



unanswered. Does the movement still aspire to or promise *revolutionary* goals? Does it subscribe to a type of reformulated reformism? Does it even have its own economic policy to put forward?

Some temptations towards ethnocentrism (Denmark, Sweden) or even the lure of *Welfare Chauvinism* is no guarantee of electoral recovery, still less of reconnecting with the world of salaried working-class people (Abou-Chadi & Wagner, 2020). In a way, European Social Democracy refuses to examine itself in the mirror, refuses to (re)think its identity and usefulness in an ever busier and increasingly globalised world and at a time of political, economic, social and societal upheaval. "Why vote social democrat?" is a question no-one seems much bothered with answering.

One hundred and fifty years after its birth, the political and electoral destiny of European Social Democracy has yet to be written. But, if social democrats fail to address the question, its fate is sealed.

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Appendix

Table 9. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Austria (ten-year average)

	SPÖ	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Austria	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1900-1909	11.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	100.0
1910-1919	23.5	0.0	0.0	23.5	100.0
1920-1929	39.5	0.1	0.7	40.2	98.2
1930-1939	41.1	0.0	0.6	41.7	98.6
1940-1949	41.3	0.0	5.2	46.5	88.8
1950-1959	43.3	0.0	4.3	47.7	90.9
1960-1969	43.3	0.0	1.7	45.0	96.2
1970-1979	50.0	0.0	1.1	51.1	97.8
1980-1989	45.0	0.0	1.3	46.3	97.2
1990-1999	37.3	0.0	0.4	37.7	99.0
2000-2009	33.7	0.0	0.8	34.5	97.6
2010-2019	25.0	0.0	0.8	25.8	96.7

Table 10. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Belgium (ten-year average)

	PS-SP.a	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Belgium	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1890-1899	18.4			18.4	
1900-1909	22.5			22.5	100.0
1910-1919	20.3			20.3	100.0
1920-1929	36.8		1.7	38.5	95.6
1930-1939	33.0		4.6	37.5	87.8
1940-1949	30.3		9.2	39.5	76.8
1950-1959	35.9		3.4	39.3	91.4
1960-1969	31.0		3.6	34.7	89.5
1970-1979	26.6		3.3	29.8	89.1
1980-1989	26.6		2.4	29.0	91.8
1990-1999	23.2		0.8	24.0	96.5
2000-2009	24.5		1.1	25.6	95.6
2010-2019	19.8		4.0	23.9	83.1

Table 11. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Bulgaria (ten-year average)

	BSP	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Bulgaria	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1990-1999	37.5		0.9	38.4	97.7
2000-2009	21.4		0.3	21.6	98.8
2010-2019	23.3		0.1	23.3	99.7

Table 12. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Croatia (ten-year average)

	SDP	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Croatia	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1990-1999	7.2			7.2	100.0
2000-2009	31.2			31.2	100.0
2010-2019	35.9			35.9	100.0

Table 13. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Cyprus (ten-year average)

	EDEK	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Cyprus	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1960-1969	0.0		34.8	34.8	0.0
1970-1979	13.7		40.7	54.4	25.2
1980-1989	9.7		30.0	39.7	24.4
1990-1999	9.5		31.9	41.3	22.9
2000-2009	7.7		32.9	40.6	19.0
2010-2019	7.7		29.4	37.1	20.6

Table 14. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in the Czech Republic (ten-year average)

	CSSD	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in the Czech Republic	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1920-1929	14.4	8.6	8.1	31.1	46.3
1930-1939	12.5	3.6	10.3	26.5	47.3
1990-1999	16.7		12.4	29.1	57.4
2000-2009	31.3		15.5	46.8	66.9
2010-2019	16.6	2.1	11.3	30.0	55.4

Table 15. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Denmark (ten-year average)

	SD	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Denmark	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1870-1879					
1880-1889	3.8			3.8	100.0
1890-1899	9.6			9.6	100.0
1900-1909	22.2			22.2	100.0
1910-1919	28.8		0.1	28.9	99.7
1920-1929	35.1		0.4	35.5	98.9
1930-1939	43.9		1.7	45.7	96.2
1940-1949	39.1		8.1	47.2	82.8
1950-1959	40.2		4.2	44.3	90.6
1960-1969	38.9		1.6	40.5	96.1
1970-1979	33.6		5.3	38.9	86.4
1980-1989	30.9		2.7	33.5	92.0
1990-1999	35.9		2.5	38.5	93.5
2000-2009	26.8		2.6	29.5	91.0
2010-2019	25.7		7.1	32.8	78.3

Table 16. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Estonia (ten-year average)

	SDE	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Latvia	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1910-1919	33.3			33.3	100.0
1920-1929	19.7			19.7	100.0
1930-1939	20.9			20.9	100.0
1940-1949					
1950-1959					
1960-1969					
1970-1979					
1980-1989					
1990-1999	10.2			10.2	100.0
2000-2009	8.9		0.3	9.2	97.2
2010-2019	14.1		0.1	14.1	99.5

Table 17. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Finland (ten-year average)

	SDP		Radical Left	Left in Finland	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1920-1929	33.0			33.0	100.0
1930-1939	37.6			37.6	100.0
1940-1949	25.7		21.6	47.4	54.3
1950-1959	25.3		22.1	47.4	53.3
1960-1969	23.4		21.6	45.0	52.0
1970-1979	24.5		17.7	42.2	58.0
1980-1989	25.4		11.5	36.9	69.0
1990-1999	24.4		11.1	35.6	68.7
2000-2009	23.0		10.2	33.2	69.2
2010-2019	17.8		8.1	25.9	68.6

Table 18. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in France (ten-year average)

	PS	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in France	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1890-1899	6.4			6.4	100.0
1900-1909	8.7			8.7	100.0
1910-1919	17.1			17.1	100.0
1920-1929	19.0		10.6	29.6	64.3
1930-1939	20.2		12.2	32.4	62.2
1940-1949	20.9		27.0	47.9	43.6
1950-1959	15.1		23.8	38.9	38.8
1960-1969	16.2	2.0	21.5	39.7	40.7
1970-1979	21.1	2.8	21.8	45.7	46.2
1980-1989	34.7	1.2	13.1	49.0	70.8
1990-1999	21.5	1.5	11.5	34.5	62.3
2000-2009	24.4	1.8	7.7	33.9	72.1
2010-2019	19.1	1.9	11.0	32.0	59.8

Table 19. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Germany (ten-year average)

	SPD	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Germany	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1870-1879	7.0			7.0	100.0
1880-1889	8.9			8.9	100.0
1890-1899	23.5			23.5	100.0
1900-1909	30.2			30.2	100.0
1910-1919	37.0	5.4		42.4	87.2
1920-1929	24.7	4.6	8.8	38.0	65.0
1930-1939	21.1	0.0	14.2	35.3	59.8
1940-1949	29.2	0.0	5.7	35.0	83.6
1950-1959	30.4	0.0	1.1	31.4	96.6
1960-1969	39.4	0.0	1.3	40.7	96.9
1970-1979	44.2	0.0	0.3	44.5	99.2
1980-1989	39.3	0.0	0.1	39.5	99.6
1990-1999	37.0	0.0	4.0	41.0	90.2
2000-2009	32.2	0.0	8.1	40.3	79.9
2010-2019	23.0	0.0	9.0	32.0	71.9

Table 20. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Greece (ten-year average)

	PASOK	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Greece	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1920-1929			2.8	2.8	0.0
1930-1939			5.1	5.1	0.0
1940-1949					
1950-1959			11.8	11.8	0.0
1960-1969			8.7	8.7	0.0
1970-1979	25.3		12.3	37.7	67.3
1980-1989	43.2	0.2	12.4	55.8	77.5
1990-1999	42.4	1.5	9.8	53.7	79.0
2000-2009	41.5	1.1	11.3	54.0	76.9
2010-2019	9.0	0.5	38.5	48.1	18.7

Table 21. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Hungary (ten-year average)

	MSZP	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Hungary	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1920-1929	14.6			14.6	100.0
1930-1939	7.6			7.6	100.0
1940-1949					
1950-1959					
1960-1969					
1970-1979					
1980-1989					
1990-1999	25.4	1.6	3.6	30.6	83.1
2000-2009	42.6		1.3	43.9	97.1
2010-2019	18.6	0.1	0.3	19.0	97.7

Table 22. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Iceland (ten-year average)

	Alliance		Radical Left	Left in Iceland	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1910-1919	6.8			6.8	100.0
1920-1929	17.7			17.7	100.0
1930-1939	19.2		6.4	25.6	74.9
1940-1949	16.1		18.5	34.6	46.4
1950-1959	15.4		16.6	32.0	48.1
1960-1969	15.0		14.9	29.9	50.1
1970-1979	15.0		19.9	34.9	43.0
1980-1989	13.6	3.6	15.1	32.3	42.1
1990-1999	17.9	0.1	12.6	30.6	58.6
2000-2009	29.2		15.0	44.2	66.1
2010-2019	10.2		14.8	25.0	40.9

Table 23. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Ireland (ten-year average)

	Labour	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Ireland	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1910-1919	3.0	0.1	0.0	3.0	97.9
1920-1929	11.0		0.4	11.4	96.8
1930-1939	8.6		0.1	8.7	98.9
1940-1949	11.1	1.7		12.8	86.6
1950-1959	10.9			10.9	99.8
1960-1969	14.8			14.8	99.9
1970-1979	12.6		1.0	13.6	92.7
1980-1989	8.8	0.1	3.5	12.4	71.3
1990-1999	14.8		3.6	18.4	80.4
2000-2009	8.7		1.2	9.9	87.6
2010-2019	13.2	1.5	0.7	15.3	85.9

Table 24. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Italy (ten-year average)

	PSI PD	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Italy	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1890-1899	7.8			7.8	100.0
1900-1909	18.2			18.2	100.0
1910-1919	25.4	1.1		26.5	95.9
1920-1929	24.7	0.6	4.6	29.9	82.6
1930-1939					
1940-1949	9.7		25.4	35.1	27.5
1950-1959	18.0	0.7	22.6	41.4	43.6
1960-1969	17.2		28.4	45.5	37.7
1970-1979	13.8		32.8	46.6	29.6
1980-1989	16.4		29.8	46.2	35.5
1990-1999	27.7	0.3	9.2	37.2	74.4
2000-2009	27.0	0.6	6.2	33.8	79.9
2010-2019	22.2	2.0	3.7	27.8	79.8

Table 25. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Latvia (ten-year average)

	Harmony	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Latvia	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1990-1999	14.7	0.3	1.8	16.9	87.5
2000-2009	14.5	0.7		15.2	95.4
2010-2019	23.4			23.4	100.0

Table 26. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Lithuania (ten-year average)

	LSDP	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Lithuania	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1990-1999	36.4		0.3	36.7	99.1
2000-2009	21.7	0.6		22.3	97.5
2010-2019	17.2		0.7	17.8	96.3

Table 27. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Luxembourg (ten-year average)

	POSL	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Luxembourg	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1910-1919	15.6			15.6	100.0
1920-1929	14.3		0.9	15.2	94.1
1930-1939	27.7		2.5	30.2	91.7
1940-1949	28.0		12.1	40.1	69.8
1950-1959	33.1		6.4	39.6	83.7
1960-1969	33.5		11.7	45.2	74.0
1970-1979	24.7	9.2	6.8	40.8	60.7
1980-1989	29.0	1.2	4.4	34.6	83.8
1990-1999	23.8		3.7	27.5	86.7
2000-2009	24.9		4.4	29.2	85.1
2010-2019	18.9		6.7	25.6	73.9

Table 28. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Malta (ten-year average)

	Labour	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Malta	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1920-1929	18.2			18.2	100.0
1930-1939	8.7	0.3		9.0	96.8
1940-1949	59.9			59.9	100.0
1950-1959	41.9	13.1		54.9	76.2
1960-1969	38.4			38.4	100.0
1970-1979	51.2			51.2	100.0
1980-1989	49.0			49.0	99.9
1990-1999	48.1			48.1	100.0
2000-2009	48.2			48.2	100.0
2010-2019	54.9			54.9	100.0

Table 29. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in The Netherlands (ten-year average)

	SDAP/PVDA	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in the Netherlands	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1880-1889	0.9			0.9	100.0
1890-1899	1.9			1.9	100.0
1900-1909	11.8			11.8	100.0
1910-1919	20.7		1.9	22.6	91.6
1920-1929	22.1		2.3	24.4	90.7
1930-1939	21.7		4.0	25.8	84.3
1940-1949	26.9		9.2	36.1	74.6
1950-1959	30.7		5.0	35.7	86.0
1960-1969	25.7		6.5	32.2	79.7
1970-1979	29.0		4.5	33.5	86.5
1980-1989	31.1		2.6	33.7	92.3
1990-1999	26.4		2.5	28.9	91.3
2000-2009	21.2		9.7	30.9	68.7
2010-2019	16.3		9.5	25.8	63.2

Table 30. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Norway (ten-year average)

	DNA	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Norway	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1890-1899	0.4			0.4	100.0
1900-1909	14.1			14.1	100.0
1910-1919	30.3			30.3	100.0
1920-1929	25.7		3.5	29.2	88.2
1930-1939	38.3		1.2	39.5	96.9
1940-1949	43.6		8.1	51.6	84.4
1950-1959	47.5		4.2	51.7	91.9
1960-1969	45.5		5.7	51.2	88.8
1970-1979	38.9		8.6	47.5	81.8
1980-1989	37.4		7.7	45.1	82.9
1990-1999	35.9		8.4	44.3	81.1
2000-2009	30.9		10.4	41.3	74.8
2010-2019	29.1		6.9	36.0	80.9

Table 31. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Poland (ten-year average)

	SLD, UP	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Poland	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1990-1999	24.5			24.5	100.0
2000-2009	21.8		0.6	22.5	97.1
2010-2019	9.7	1.1	0.3	11.1	87.3

Table 32. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Portugal (ten-year average)

	PS	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Portugal	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1970-1979	35.0	0.8	19.4	55.2	63.4
1980-1989	27.3	0.3	19.0	46.6	58.6
1990-1999	39.8		11.5	51.3	77.6
2000-2009	40.9		15.1	56.1	73.0
2010-2019	33.6	0.4	17.3	51.3	65.4

Table 33. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Romania (ten-year average)

	PSD, PSDR	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Romania	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1920-1929	1.1			1.1	100.0
1930-1939	1.9			1.9	100.0
1940-1949	0.0				
1950-1959	0.0				
1960-1969	0.0				
1970-1979	0.0				
1980-1989	0.0				
1990-1999	7.4		0.4	7.8	94.7
2000-2009	36.5		0.0	36.5	100.0
2010-2019	52.2 *		0.0	52.2	100.0

* Electoral Cartel

Table 34. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Serbia (ten-year average)

	PD	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Serbia	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
2000-2009	17.6			17.6	100.0
2010-2019	6.8			6.8	100.0

Table 35. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Slovakia (ten-year average)

	SLD SMER	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Slovakia	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1990-1999	12.7	0.2	6.9	19.8	64.1
2000-2009	20.4	9.6	6.0	36.0	56.7
2010-2019	35.8	0.9	0.7	37.4	95.8

Table 36. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Slovenia (ten-year average)

	SD	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Slovenia	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1990-1999	6.0		0.2	6.3	96.4
2000-2009	18.1		0.1	18.2	99.6
2010-2019	9.2		4.9	14.1	65.5

Table 37. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Spain (ten-year average)

	PSOE	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Spain	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1930-1939	* 34.8		0.9	35.7	97.4
1940-1949					
1950-1959					
1960-1969					
1970-1979	29.9	3.5	12.3	45.7	65.5
1980-1989	44.2		7.2	51.4	86.0
1990-1999	38.5		10.3	48.8	78.9
2000-2009	41.0		4.9	45.9	89.4
2010-2019	25.8		19.7	45.5	56.7

* Electoral cartel in 1936

Table 38. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Sweden (ten-year average)

	SAP	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in the Netherlands	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1900-1909	10.2			10.2	
1910-1919	31.6			31.6	100.0
1920-1929	37.2		6.4	43.6	85.2
1930-1939	44.4		7.9	52.3	84.9
1940-1949	48.5		7.0	55.5	87.4
1950-1959	45.6		4.2	49.8	91.5
1960-1969	48.5		4.2	52.6	92.1
1970-1979	43.7		5.1	48.8	89.5
1980-1989	44.5		5.6	50.1	88.9
1990-1999	39.9		7.5	47.4	84.1
2000-2009	36.8		7.0	43.8	83.9
2010-2019	29.9		6.5	36.4	82.2



Table 39. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in Switzerland (ten-year average)

	SPS	Other SD	Radical Left	Left in Switzerland	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1890-1899	8.2			8.2	100.0
1900-1909	14.9			14.9	100.0
1910-1919	22.3			22.3	100.0
1920-1929	25.5		1.9	27.3	93.1
1930-1939	27.6		1.7	29.3	94.1
1940-1949	27.2		2.7	29.9	91.1
1950-1959	26.5		2.6	29.1	90.9
1960-1969	25.1		2.5	27.6	90.8
1970-1979	24.0	0.4	2.3	26.7	89.9
1980-1989	20.6	0.5	0.8	22.0	93.7
1990-1999	20.9	0.2	1.0	22.1	94.7
2000-2009	21.3		0.8	22.2	96.4
2010-2019	18.1		1.4	19.5	93.0



Table 40. Evolution of the social democratic party and other Left parties' electoral results in the United Kingdom (ten-year average)

	Labour		Radical Left	Left in the UK	Percentage of the Social Democratic party in the left
1900-1909	3.5			3.5	100.0
1910-1919	4.2			4.2	99.2
1920-1929	33.2		0.3	33.5	99.2
1930-1939	33.7		0.2	33.9	99.3
1940-1949	48.0		0.4	48.4	99.2
1950-1959	46.3		0.2	46.5	99.6
1960-1969	46.1		0.2	46.3	99.6
1970-1979	39.2		0.1	39.4	99.7
1980-1989	29.7		0.1	29.8	99.6
1990-1999	39.3		0.0	39.3	99.9
2000-2009	38.6		0.3	38.8	99.3
2010-2019	33.3			33.4	99.9



Table 41. Elections in Europe taken into account in the analysis

	1870-1879	1880-1889	1890-1899	1900-1909	1910-1919	1920-1929	1930-1939	1940-1949	1950-1959	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2009	2010-2019	N
Austria				1	2	3	1	2	3	2	4	2	4	3	3	30
Belgium			1	1	2	3	3	2	3	3	4	3	3	2	3	33
Bulgaria													4	3	3	10
Croatia													2	3	3	8
Cyprus											1	2	2	2	2	9
Czech Republic						3	1						4	2	3	13
Denmark		2	3	4	3	6	3	3	4	4	5	4	3	3	3	50
Estonia													3	2	3	8
Finland						3	4	2	3	2	4	2	3	2	3	28
France			2	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	2	3	2	2	2	31
Germany	5	3	3	2	2	4	4	1	2	3	2	3	3	3	2	42
Greece										1	1	4	3	4	5	18
Hungary						2	3						3	2	3	13
Iceland					3	2	4	4	4	2	4	2	3	3	3	33
Ireland					1	5	4	3	3	3	2	5	2	2	3	33



Italy			2	3	2	1		1	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	25
Latvia													3	1	3	7
Lithuania													2	3	2	7
Luxemburg					1	3	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	24
Malta						3	2	1	4	2	2	2	3	2	2	23
Norway			2	4	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	34
Poland													3	3	3	9
Portugal											3	4	3	3	3	16
Romania						2	3						3	3	2	13
Serbia														3	3	5
Slovakia													2	2	3	7
Slovenia													2	3	3	8
Spain											2	3	2	3	5	15
Sweden				3	4	4	2	3	3	3	4	3	3	2	3	37
The Netherlands		1	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	2	3	4	2	3	3	36
United Kingdom				2	3	4	2	1	4	2	4	2	2	2	4	32
Switzerland			2	3	4	3	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	35
N	5	6	18	28	35	59	49	34	49	41	57	57	83	81	92	692



Table 42. Countries, parties and national elections in Europe taken into account in the analysis

Austria	SPÖ	1907, 1911, 1919, 1920, 1923, 1927, 1930, 1945, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1959, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017, 2019
Belgium	POB-BWP	1894, 1900, 1912, 1919, 1921, 1925, 1929, 1932, 1936, 1939
	PSB-BSP	1946, 1949, 1950, 1954, 1958, 1961, 1961, 1965, 1968, 1971, 1974, 1977
	PS & sp.a	1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014, 2019
Bulgaria	BSP	1990, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017
Croatia	SDP	1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2016
Cyprus	EDEK	1970, 1976, 1981, 1985, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016
Czech Republic	CSSD	1920, 1925, 1929, 1935, 1990, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017
Danemark	SD	1884, 1887, 1890, 1892, 1895, 1898, 1901, 1903, 1906, 1909, 1910, 1913, 1918, 1920, 1920 (b), 1920 ©, 1924, 1926, 1929, 1932, 1935, 1939, 1943, 1945, 1947, 1950, 1953, 1953 (b), 1957, 1960, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
Estonia	SDE	1992, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
Finland	SDP	1924, 1927, 1929, 1930, 1933, 1936, 1939, 1945, 1948, 1951, 1954, 1958, 1962, 1966, 1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
France	SFIO	1893, 1898, 1902, 1906, 1910, 1914, 1919, 1924, 1928, 1932, 1936, 1945, 1946, 1946 (b), 1951, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1967, 1968
	PS	1973, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 2003, 2007, 2012, 2017



Germany	SPD	1871, 1874, 1877, 1878, 1881, 1884, 1887, 1890, 1893, 1898, 1903, 1907, 1912, 1919, 1920, 1924, 1924 (b), 1928, 1930, 1932, 1932 (b), 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
Greece	PASOK	1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1989 (b), 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2012 (b), 2015, 2015 (b), 2019
Hungary	MSZP	1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018
Iceland	SDP	1916, 1917, 1919, 1923, 1927, 1931, 1933, 1934, 1937, 1942, 1942 (b), 1946, 1949, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1959 (b), 1963, 1967, 1971, 1974, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999
	Alliance	2003, 2007, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017
Ireland	Labour	1918, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1927, 1927 (b), 1932, 1933, 1937, 1938, 1943, 1944, 1948, 1951, 1954, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1982 (b), 1987, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2016
Italy	PSI	1895, 1897, 1900, 1903, 1909, 1913, 1919, 1921, 1946, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1996
	PSDI	1953, 1958, 1963, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992
	PD (DS)	1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018
Latvia	Harmony	1993, 1995, 1998, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018
	LSDSP	1998, 2002, 2006, 2018
	SDS	2002
Lithuania	LSDP	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
	LDDP	1992, 1996
Luxemburg	LSAP	1919, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934, 1937, 1945, 1948, 1951, 1954, 1959, 1964, 1968, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2013, 2017
Malta	Labour	1921, 1924, 1927, 1932, 1939, 1947, 1950, 1951, 1953, 1955, 1962, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1987, 1992, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, 2017
Netherlands	SDAP	1888, 1891, 1894, 1897, 1901, 1905, 1909, 1913, 1918, 1922, 1925, 1929, 1933, 1937



	PVDA	1946, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2017,
Norway	DNA	1894, 1897, 1900, 1903, 1906, 1909, 1912, 1915, 1918, 1921, 1924, 1927, 1930, 1933, 1936, 1945, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2017
Poland	SLD (SDRP)	1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
	UP	1993, 1997
Portugal	PS	1975, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2019
Romania	PSD	1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
	PSDR	1926, 1927, 1932, 1933, 1937, 1990, 1992
Serbia	PD (DS)	2003, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2016
Slovenia	SD	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2018
Spain	PSOE	1933, 1936, 1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2019 (b)
Sweden	SAP	1902, 1905, 1908, 1911, 1914, 1914 (b), 1917, 1920, 1921, 1924, 1928, 1932, 1936, 1940, 1944, 1948, 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1968, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018
Switzerland	SPS	1896, 1899, 1902, 1905, 1908, 1911, 1914, 1917, 1919, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 1935, 1939, 1943, 1947, 1951, 1955, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019
United Kingdom	Labour	1900, 1906, 1910, 1910 (b), 1918, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1929, 1931, 1935, 1945, 1950, 1951, 1955, 1959, 1964, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1974 (b), 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017, 2019
	SDLP	1974, 1974 (b), 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2017, 2019

